CSO Transparency and Accountability Initiatives:

Variables of Impact

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This research note reviews summarizes the available research on the variables that play a role in CSO impact. It presents the following 5 generic impact pathways used by CSOs and discusses the variables that play a role in each of these:

- CSOs can use litigation as an effective means to enforce greater accountability
- CSOs can deepen their impact and therefore improve government accountability by using the media to disseminate their findings and recommendations more widely.
- CSOs can improve government accountability and influence policy priorities by presenting evidence to members of the executive branch of government.
- CSOs can improve government accountability and influence policy priorities by improving the capacity of the legislative branch of government.
- CSOs can improve government accountability and influence policy priorities by mobilising citizens and CSOs for campaigns seeking reforms.

Each of the variables are extensively referenced from the literature that the review draws on. The variables that are presented can also be classified by whether they are internal to the organization or campaign or whether they are external or contextual in nature. The table below summarizes the findings of the paper.

SUMMARY OF IMPACT PATHWAY VARIABLES

	Internal	**External**
Litigation	Quality Research	Independent Judiciaries Constitutional Commitments to Basic Rights Access to Information Active Media
Media	Technical capacity Quality of Research Outputs Adopting a Media strategy	Media Freedom Technical capacity of Journalists Existence of Community Radio
Presenting evidence to the Executive	Quality of Research Engagement Strategy Linking to international campaigns, standards	Political Will Champions within government Enabling legal frameworks State capacity to deliver Access to Information
Building the capacity of the Legislature	Holistic Capacity Building Strategy Change culture of engagement Quality of Research Long term strategy Sensitivity to local context Work with political parties	Legislature capacity to oversee
Mobilizing citizens & CSOs	Working in Coalitions and Alliances Varied campaign initiatives Representation in formal governance spaces Training and Capacitating Citizens and Grassroots CSOs Analytical skill Political/advocacy skills	Access to Information Citizens believe change is possible
General Variables		Need for time and resources Decentralization

IMPACT PATHWAY – LITIGATION

Hypothesis

CSOs can use litigation as an effective means to enforce greater accountability

Conditions for Success:

- **Independent Judiciaries** – The case studies draw attention to the successful use of litigation by CSOs in South Africa and India, both countries which have vibrant, politically independent judiciaries.[1] In contrast, a recent stocktaking exercise of CSOs in Africa noted that the effectiveness of CSOs in enforcing accountability was weak because of the 'inability of judicial systems in most African countries to play a more punitive role in enforcing accountability mechanisms.'[2] The existence of independent judiciaries that are not subject to executive influence would appear to be a precondition for the effective use of litigation by CSOs.

- **Constitutional commitments to Basic Rights** – Case study evidence from both India, and especially South Africa, demonstrate that Constitutional commitments to basic rights, such as water or housing, are a necessary precondition for effective TAI litigation. When Constitutions contain justiciable commitments to rights, evidence indicates that CSOs are able to use litigation to compel executive authorities to implement policy changes.

- **Access to Information** – Evidence from India and South Africa also illustrates that the existence of effective Right to Information (RTI) legislation is an important factor in supporting successful litigation. CSOs in both India and South Africa have used RTI laws to gain access to information which has formed the basis of successful litigation campaigns.

- **Active Media** – Case studies also demonstrate that successful litigation by CSOs is accompanied by interest from the media. Both in India and South Africa, the media played an active role in publicising the efforts of CSOs in relation to their litigation.

- **Quality Research** – A success factor in regard to litigation in South Africa has been the high quality of research that CSOs have used in support of their litigation. Both in regard to expanding health coverage for those with HIV & AIDS and extending the reach of social grants, compelling research was presented to the courts in support of CSOs litigation objectives.

- **Surrogate Courts** - In a context where the judiciary is not independent and/or where rights are not enshrined in constitutions case study evidence suggests that social audits can function as 'surrogate courts.' Complex and well organised social audits can 'represent a "legalisation" of social action.' Evidence suggests that social audits can have a significant impact and can potentially be a credible alternative, especially at local level, to an ineffective judiciary.[3]

IMPACT PATHWAY - MEDIA

Hypothesis

CSOs can deepen their impact and therefore improve government accountability by using the media to disseminate their findings and recommendations more widely.

Conditions for Success:

- **Media Freedom** –Case study evidence confirms that where the media is free of government interference and ownership is broadly based, CSOs are able to disseminate their findings widely through various media platforms. Evidence also shows, however, that even in regimes with restricted media environments CSOs can still use the media to open up space to demand greater government accountability. For example, in Uganda, where media freedom is partially restricted[4], CSOs have still managed to have an impact on both public debate and policy choices.[5] The same can be said for numerous other countries, such as Indonesia, Malawi or the Philippines, which only have partially free media environments but have vibrant CSOs which continue to demand greater accountability from government. The ability of CSOs to successfully use the media to further their objectives in both free, and partially free media contexts, is dependent on a number of inter-related factors which are detailed in the following analysis.

- **Technical Capacity of CSOs** – Case study evidence illustrates that CSOs need to have a high degree of technical capacity to be able to meaningfully interpret information which they possess. This is especially so in regard to budget based advocacy. Evidence from five African countries[6] suggests that while CSOs do make use of the media to widen the public debate on such issues as total levels of public spending, they generally lack the technical capacity to address more fundamental questions, such as how to make macro-economic policy more pro-poor.[7] Conversely, there is ample evidence to show that CSOs that have a higher level of technical expertise can stimulate wider debates, and influence change, around macro-economic policy and the developmental agenda by disseminating their findings and recommendations to the media.[8] Evidence therefore indicates that the more technical capacity a TAI has, the more likely it will be able to use the media to deepen public debates around accountability issues.

- **Quality of Research Outputs** – There is a great deal of evidence that shows that CSOs gain the trust of journalists, and consequently increase their media exposure, by producing accurate and reliable data. Case study evidence from a number of contexts demonstrates that high quality research lends legitimacy to CSOs and their campaigns and results in increased media interaction and exposure.[9]

- **Technical Capacity of Journalists** – CSOs can only use the media to deepen public debate around accountability issues if they are able to successfully engage with journalists. CSOs have successfully used two mechanisms to enrich their engagement with journalists. Firstly, they have simplified their analysis to make it more understandable and accessible to journalists. There is now a body of case study evidence that demonstrates that providing

concise and 'demystifying' information to journalists can improve access to the media and lead to increased media exposure for CSOs.[10] Secondly, they have trained journalists in budget analysis. There are also a compelling number of case studies from a wide variety of contexts which demonstrate that providing training to journalists improves media exposure. For example, in Uganda the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) has found that training journalists on issues around HIV & AIDS has resulted in more, and better, reporting on the issue in Uganda.[11]

- **Adopting a Media Strategy** – Evidence suggests that media engagement improves when CSOs adopt deliberate and comprehensive media strategies, rather than engaging with the media on an ad hoc basis. In the absence of a media strategy, interaction with the media can become erratic. In India, one TAI noted that there was little interest in its media outputs unless they featured corruption, while another noted that it found it difficult to sustain media interest outside of the budget process.[12] The latter TAI has since introduced a 'comprehensive media strategy' to improve its engagement with the media.

  There are at least two examples where CSOs have employed specialist media agencies to assist them with their media strategies.[13] For media strategies to be effective they must be varied and make use of different media forms. Case study evidence suggests that CSOs that use multiple media platforms garner most media attention.[14] For example, in Indonesia the Forum for Budget Transparency uses a number of different techniques to garner media interest - these include: the publication of reports; the dissemination of information via press releases; the holding of public discussions; and the distribution of posters and leaflets etc. These coordinated media interventions have undoubtedly contributed to the Forum's overall impact in Indonesia.[15]

  There is some evidence to suggest that CSOs can improve government accountability by adopting unconventional strategies. For example, in India one successful TAI campaign used children to fill out citizen report cards which resulted in extensive media coverage, while another successful campaign gained the support of prominent celebrities to garner increased media attention.[16] While such novel interventions may enhance media exposure in the shorter term, doubts remain about their long-term viability.

- **Community Radio** – There is a considerable amount of evidence that suggests that using community radio stations, especially in Africa, is an effective means of disseminating information to citizens who do not have access to more traditional media.[17] This is especially so in cases where national radio stations are subject to state control.[18]

IMPACT PATHWAY – PRESENTING NEW EVIDENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE

Hypothesis

CSOs can improve government accountability and influence policy priorities by presenting evidence to members of the executive branch of government.

- **Political Will** – The issue of political will is obviously an important factor which influences the ability of CSOs to interact with executive levels of government. The issue of political will is problematic in the literature, partly because it is ill-defined and partly because it is the result of numerous other interrelated factors. That said, political will is clearly very important – the success of participatory budgeting processes in Latin America has been largely due to the political will of the governments that have implemented it.[19] Conversely, CSOs have faced problems due to an absence of political will.[20] Political will is something which gets made, broken and remade due a complex set of highly interrelated factors, some of which are detailed in this review.

- **Champions within Government** – CSOs have successfully engaged with the executive by making use of sympathetic individuals, or alliances of sympathetic individuals within governments. This engagement appears to take place in one of two ways – via civil society activists who have entered government[21], or via government members who are sympathetic to the pro-poor objectives of CSOs.[22] While relationships with 'champions' within government can, and often do, prove beneficial, the nature of politics means that such relationships can be temporary.

- **Quality of research** - There is a significant body of evidence which illustrates that CSOs can exert greater influence on government by producing high quality research outputs.[23] Evidence indicates that government's can respond positively to high quality research outputs, especially in contexts where they lack research capacity themselves. In effect, CSOs can offer an incentive to governments to engage with them by offering them research and analysis. This has happened in a number of countries, especially in regard to budget work.[24]

  Conversely, evidence from Anglophone Africa shows that where CSOs lack technical capacity their effectiveness is 'impaired', meaning that they will inevitably find it more difficult to influence the executive branch of government.[25]

- **Enabling Legislative Framework** – States which have enabling legal frameworks related to the realisation of social and economic rights, or strong policy goal frameworks, create spaces within which CSOs can interact with executive arms of government.[26] In contrast, case study evidence indicates that where such frameworks do not exist, or are inadequately enforced due to a lack of political will, CSOs face limitations in terms of their ability to influence government decision makers.[27] Evidence suggests, therefore, that the existence of strong legal and regulatory imperatives which compel governments to account for their actions and meet certain minimum levels of service delivery is one of the necessary pre-conditions for CSOs to be able to influence the executive arms of governments.

- **Engagement Strategy** – There is some case study evidence which suggests that states are more willing to engage with CSOs which have shown a more collaborative and less critical engagement with government. Case study evidence from India, Brazil and South Africa, demonstrates that governments have been more willing to engage with CSOs which adopt a 'participatory/collaborative' approach as opposed to those which have adopted a 'critical/protest' approach.[28] Research from Anglophone Africa shows that one of the most significant problems faced by CSOs is mistrust by governments, which tend to view civil society organisations with suspicion, fearing that they are trying to achieve regime change.[29]

- **State Capacity to Deliver** – Another external factor which appears to influence the ability of CSOs to influence governments is the actual capacity of governments to deliver services demanded by CSOs. There is substantial case study evidence from Latin America that shows that one of the key ingredients in the success of participatory budgeting has been governments' willingness to ensure that sufficient public funding and technical capacity exists to fund the demands that are made via participatory processes.[30] Evidence from South Africa demonstrates how CSOs have proved to the government that it has sufficient funds to deliver particular services, even when it has been resistant to do so.[31] In contrast, some case study evidence also demonstrates that CSOs can raise expectations that cannot be met by existing state capacity which can prove to be 'destabilising'.[32]

  While this review has found little direct evidence to support the contention that governments have resisted TAI demands because of a lack of capacity to deliver, it seems logical to assume that unrealistic demands made on the executive are unlikely to be met with positive responses.[33]

- **Linking to international campaigns, goals or standards** – There is evidence in the literature which shows that CSOs have had success in influencing the executive arms of government by linking their objectives to international campaigns, goals and standards. Evidence suggests that CSOs can gain legitimacy by linking their objectives to international norms and standards, thus giving their arguments more weight when engaging with the executive.[34] Evidence from Mexico shows how linking campaigns to international standards relating to maternal mortality gave CSOs greater political and social leverage over the government which had signed up to a number of commitments in regard to maternal mortality.[35] Case study evidence also points to the importance of linking campaigns to developmental goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals – both to internationalise campaigns, but also to use such commitments as a yardstick by which to evaluate government performance.[36]

- **Access to Information** – Evidence from India and South Africa also illustrates that the existence of effective RTI legislation is an important factor in being able to present evidence to the executive branch of government. CSOs in both India and South Africa have used RTI laws to gain access to information which has formed the basis of successful campaigns which have resulted in changes in government policy.[37]

IMPACT PATHWAY – BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

Hypothesis

CSOs can improve government accountability and influence policy priorities by improving the capacity of the legislative branch of government.

- **Holistic Capacity Building Strategy** – Case study evidence suggests that efforts to build the capacity of legislative branches of government are unlikely to succeed if they are undertaken in isolation. Case studies demonstrate that improving the capacity of the legislature does not necessarily lead to improved government accountability because of resistance from the executive (lack of political will) and capacity limitations within institutions necessary for the effective oversight functioning of legislatures (such as supreme audit institutions).[38] The implications of this are that efforts should be focussed on supporting multiple role-players (executive, legislature, supreme audit institutions, judiciary, civil society, media), that influence the effectiveness of legislative oversight, rather than narrowly focussing on members of the legislature.

  There also appears to be a general consensus that capacity building within legislatures should not just be directed at elected representatives, as it should also be directed at important support staff, such as researchers that work for legislative oversight committees.[39]

- **Changing culture of engagement** - Evidence also suggests that efforts should be made to not only build capacity, but also to produce positive behavioural changes between the various role-players that influence the effectiveness of legislative oversight. One case study overview noted that efforts need to be made to 'change the perceptions of actors themselves, so that they begin to view the engagement with others as constructive.'[40]

- **Quality of Research** – Once again, the evidence highlights the importance of quality research produced by CSOs. Case studies show that CSOs can influence the oversight process and improve government accountability by empowering legislature members with high quality research which will be taken seriously by members of the executive.[41] The production of high-quality research not only gives legislative members an incentive to engage with CSOs, but also (and critically) with the executive.

- **Long-Term Strategy** – Case study evidence shows that interventions aimed at improving parliamentary effectiveness must be of a long-term nature. Relationships between CSOs and legislatures in particular need to be cultivated over a period of time because trust needs to be built up between the respective parties.[42]

- **Sensitivity to Local Contexts** – There is evidence which indicates that initiatives to improve legislative performance can be strengthened by linking them to any pre-existing national parliamentary plans related to institutional development. This appears to encourage 'local ownership' of such projects. In addition, recent evidence suggests that legislative members

tend to be more responsive to training or support from members of parliaments from neighbouring countries, than from those in the 'developed' world.[43]

- **Working with Political Parties** – Two recent studies stress the need for initiatives aimed at strengthening oversight to engage with political parties, both those in power and from the opposition. Case study research suggests that efforts need to be made to understand how political parties influence the behaviour of parliamentarians within each country. This is especially so in countries such as South Africa, where single parties dominate the political landscape.[44] Therefore, initiatives should look to engage with political parties around issues relating to the oversight role of legislatures.

- **Legislature oversight capacity** – Recent evidence from 31 African countries illustrates that legislative oversight of government spending is more effective in the budget formulation and planning stages, than in the execution and resource management stages. In particular, weaknesses were common in regard to internal controls, internal auditing, procurement and payroll management.[45] This finding is common in all 31 countries, regardless of context. This suggests that capacity building should focus on enabling legislatures to be able to better interrogate and evaluate the execution of budgets. It also confirms the previous contention that capacity building efforts need to focus on a broad range of actors involved in the oversight process.

IMPACT PATHWAY – MOBILISING CITIZENS AND CSOS FOR CAMPAIGNS SEEKING CHANGE

Hypothesis

CSOs can improve government accountability and influence policy priorities by mobilising citizens and CSOs for campaigns seeking reforms.

- **Working in Coalitions and Alliances** – There is a considerable amount of case study evidence which indicates that CSOs that participate in coalitions and alliances with other elements of civil society, such as community groups, increase their impact. Evidence suggests that CSOs which generate research outputs are unlikely to meaningfully effect change unless they engage with a broad range of actors. Research from a diverse range of global country contexts demonstrates that coalitions and alliances which combine research with community participation and activism are more likely to succeed.[46]

  If CSOs join coalitions and alliances and prove that they legitimately represent a significant portion of society, evidence suggests that governments will take them more seriously.[47] Membership of broad coalitions also negates the possibility of government's ignoring interventions on the basis that they only represent narrow group or class interests.[48]

- **Varied Campaign Initiatives** – CSOs have more impact when they adopt varied advocacy activities.[49] Successful campaigns often combine a range of activities from social protest (or at least the threat of protest), to extensive use of the media, and litigation, as examples from both South Africa and India demonstrate.[50]

- **Representation Within Formal Governance Spaces** – There is a growing body of evidence which demonstrates that CSOs can make significant progress towards their objectives by collaborating with governments and creating 'space' for participation.[51] Such 'space' appears to be made via pressure from civil society (initially citizen-led initiatives that gather momentum), by reformist governments, or by influential reformist figures within governments.[52] The classic example of such 'space' would be the 'space' created for participatory budgeting in Brazil, but there are numerous other examples. However, for such 'spaces' to be effective a number of pre-conditions need to be met:

  1. The likelihood of such joint initiatives succeeding increases when civil society representation is broadly based. Case study evidence shows that accountability spaces created by governments can be largely tokenistic or subject to elite capture if they are not backed up by extensive collective action by civil society figures, both within and outside of formal structures.[53]
  2. Both civil society representatives and government should be responsible for the design of collaborative initiatives. Evidence shows that collaborative initiatives are more successful when there has been active participation from civil society at the design stage.[54]
  3. Projects must ensure that civil society has access to policymakers over at least the medium, if not long term.[55]

4. Participatory 'spaces' need to be formally and legally created and have clear rules and institutionalised locations in the decision making process.[56]
5. Collaborative 'spaces' must also offer citizens and CSOs that represent them 'clear incentives for citizens to cooperate.'[57]
6. Collaborative 'spaces' also need to have the potential to trigger strong sanctions because 'without the threat of effective sanctions (and resulting impacts) citizen mobilisation is difficult to sustain.'[58]

- **Access to Information** – Evidence from India and South Africa also illustrates that the existence of effective RTI legislation is an important factor in enabling CSOs and citizens to engage with government. CSOs in both India and South Africa have used RTI laws to gain access to information which has formed the basis of successful campaigns which have resulted in changes in government policy.[59] RTI legislation is also an important tool by which CSOs can share information with citizens and fellow CSOs.

- **Training and Capacitating Citizens and Grassroots CSOs** – Evidence shows that both citizens and grassroots CSOs need to be exposed to training and capacity building to deepen social accountability.[60] For social accountability initiatives to succeed, citizens need to be trained, and their technical capacity improved. For example, for participatory budgeting or social auditing to thrive, CSOs need to be able to train citizens in the various techniques they will need to participate in a meaningful fashion.[61]

- **Analytical skills of CSOs** – CSOs themselves also need to ensure that they have sufficient capacity to fulfil their mandates. Evidence from social accountability stocktaking exercises in Africa and Asia demonstrate that the impact of CSOs can become compromised because of limited technical skills within such organisations.[62] This clearly illustrates that CSOs themselves need support to be able to undertake their own analysis and enable them to capacitate citizens and grassroots CSOs.

- **Political/advocacy Skills** – One social accountability stocktaking exercise states that CSOs need to exhibit political as well as technical skills to succeed. CSOs need political skills to be able to forge alliances, develop evidence and advocate for change. In addition, and importantly, CSOs need political skills to be able to assist oversight institutions, such as parliaments, in strengthening their role in regard to powerful state institutions such as the executive.[63]

- **Citizens Need to Believe that Change is Possible** – There is some case study evidence which demonstrates that there is the potential for CSOs to fail because citizens do not believe that changes in government policy are possible because there are pervasive beliefs that the state is either unwilling or unable to actually effect change.[64] This issue can clearly present a problem for CSOs which need to demonstrate to communities that they can, with popular support and participation from the communities, influence change.

GENERAL EXTERNAL VARIABLES

There are two general variables that impact on the success of CSOs in non-specific ways:

- **Need for Time and Resources to Succeed** – There is a considerable amount of evidence that demonstrates that CSOs need longer-term support (financial, technical and in terms of time), to succeed. Evidence from numerous global contexts shows that it takes time for interventions to become sustainable, especially in more 'fragile' states.[65] For example, in Bangladesh, local district authorities are not willing to work with citizens despite more than 10 years of effort.[66] A number of case study reviews draw attention to limitations placed on CSOs by the short-term (3 – 5 year) nature of most donor funded support for such initiatives. One review draws attention to the phasing out of CSOs in South and South East Asia due to the premature withdrawal of donor support.[67] Another notes how a lack of financial resources threatens the sustainability of CSOs throughout Anglophone Africa.[68]

  Both donors and partner organisations which support CSOs need to be aware that evidence seems to indicate that for CSOs to become sustainable they need longer-term support than is normally offered by funders. Such support is not limited to financial support, as it is clear that many CSOs also need extended periods of technical support.

- **Decentralization** – Case study evidence is limited in regard to the effect that decentralisation has on CSOs. One stocktaking survey noted a number of limited positive outcomes from decentralisation processes in a diverse set of contexts.[69] Overall, however, evidence indicates that the success or failure of CSOs that engage with local level decentralised government structures is dependent on exactly the same set of factors (indicated above) which determine the relative success of CSOs that interact on a national basis.[70] While decentralisation offers, in theory, greater opportunities for interaction between policy makers and the public there is, as yet, too little evidence to indicate whether this is the case.

[1] See, N. Overy, 'South Africa: Civil Society Uses Budget Analysis to Improve the Lives of Poor Children,' International Budget Partnership, 2010 and, N. Overy, 'The TAC and Budget Advocacy,' Unpublished Paper, International Budget Partnership, 2010. R. Sinha, 'Evidence-Based Advocacy for the Increase in Wages Under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Case Studies from Jharkhand and Gujarat,' PRIA Global Partnership, 2010, and 'A. Mehtta, '"Good Effort, But Must Try Harder": Civil Society Organisations and Education in Delhi', in State Reform and Social Accountability: Brazil, India and Mexico, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 38, No. 6, Jan. 2008.

[2] M. McNeil and T. Mumvuma, 'Demanding Good Governance: A Stocktaking of Social Accountability Initiatives by Civil Society in Anglophone Africa,' World Bank, 2006, p. 5.

[3] A. Goetz & R. Jenkins, 'Hybrid Forums of Accountability: Citizen Engagement in Institutions of Public Sector Oversight in India,' Public Management Review, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 2001, p. 368.

[4] Freedom House rates Uganda's media as being 'partly free', see http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/2009/FreedomofthePress2009_tables.pdf. In Uganda, journalists have to be licensed with the state, while the Minister of Information can ban publications if it is in the 'public interest' to do so. See, J. Odoi, 'Using the Media to Advance Social Accountability in Uganda', in M. Claasen (ed.), Social Accountability in Africa: Practitioners' Experiences and Lessons, IDASA, 2010, p. 54.

[5] See, J. Odoi, 'Using the Media…' and P. Renzio (et al), 'Budget Monitoring as an Advocacy Tool: Uganda Debt Network,' IBP, 2006.

[6] Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda.

[7] M. Foster (et al), 'How, When and Why does Poverty get Budget Priority: Poverty Reduction Strategy and Public Expenditure in Five African Countries,' Synthesis Paper, ODI, Working Paper 168, 2002, p. 33.

[8] See, L. Malajovich & M. Robinson, 'Budget Analysis and Social Activism: The Case of DISHA in Gujarat, India', IBP, 2006 and N. Overy, 'South Africa: Civil Society Uses Budget Analysis to Improve the Lives of Poor Children,' International Budget Partnership, 2010.

[9] See, M. Robinson, 'Budget Analysis and Policy Advocacy: The Role of Nongovernmental Public Action', IDS Working Paper 279, 2006, p. 27. For a compelling account of the critical importance of quality research see, A. Pollard & J. Court, 'How Civil Society Organisations Use Evidence to Influence Policy Processes: A Literature Review', ODI, 2005.

[10] As a starting point see, K. Sirker & S. Cosic, 'Empowering the Marginalised: Case Studies of Social Accountability Initiatives in Asia', World Bank Institute, 2007.

[11] See, J. Odoi, 'Using the Media…', p. 60.

[12] See, D. Arroyo & K. Sirker, 'Stocktaking of Social Accountability Initiatives in the Asia and Pacific Region', World Bank Institute, 2005, p. 21 and Sirker, 'Empowering the Marginalised…', p. 15.

[13] M. Robinson, 'Democratizing the Budget: Fundar's Budget Analysis and Advocacy Initiatives in Mexico', IBP, 2006, p. 21 and P. de Renzio & J. Shultz, 'Budget Work and Democracy Building: The Case of IBASE in Brazil', IBP, 2006, p. 19.

[14] C. Malena (et al), 'Social Accountability: An Introduction to the Concept and Emerging Practise', The World Bank, 2004, p. 13.

[15] K. Sirker & S. Cosic, 'Empowering the Marginalised…', pp. 9 – 11.

[16] K. Sirker & S. Cosic, 'Empowering the Marginalised…', pp. 64, and P. Chakrabarti, 'Inclusion or Exclusion? Emerging Effects of Middle-Class Citizen Participation on Delhi's Urban Poor', IDS Bulletin, Vol. 38, No. 6, 2008, p. 98.

[17] M. McNeil & T. Mumvuma, 'Demanding Good Governance: A Stocktaking of Social Accountability Initiatives by Civil Society in Anglophone Africa,' World Bank Institute, 2006, p. 22.

[18] M. Foster (et al), 'How, When and Why does Poverty get Budget Priority…', p. 33.

[19] See, B. Goldfrank, 'Lessons from Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting', Presentation to Latin American Studies Association, 2006 and D. Brautigam, 'The People's Budget? Politics, Participation and Pro-poor Policy', Development Policy Review, 22 (6), 2004.

[20] See, R. Carlitz, 'The Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives: A Review of the Evidence to Date – Budget Processes,' IDS, 2010, p. 19 and J. Bosworth, Citizens, Accountability and Public Expenditure: A Rapid Review of DFID Support,' DFID, Working Paper 17, 2005, p. 17.

[21] See, for example, J. Gomez-Jauregui, 'Participation in Reproductive Health Policies in the Context of Health System Reform in Mexico', IDB Bulletin, Vol. 38, No. 6, 2008.

[22] See, for example, case studies in, J. Gaventa & R. McGee, 'Citizen Action and National Policy Reform', Zed Books, London, 2010.

[23] See, for example, N. Overy, 'South Africa: Civil Society Uses Budget Analysis…', N. Overy, 'The TAC and Budget Advocacy,' P. Renzio (et al), 'Budget Monitoring as an Advocacy Tool …'.

[24] See the example of the Uganda Debt Network in, P. Renzio (et al), 'Budget Monitoring as an Advocacy Tool'.

[25] M. McNeil & T. Mumvuma, 'Demanding Good Governance …', p. vii.

[26] See previous section on litigation and, for example, 'A. Norton & D. Elson, 'What's Behind the Budget? Politics, Rights and Accountability', ODI, 2002, p. ix.

[27] See, for example, M. McNeil and T. Mumvuma, 'Demanding Good Governance…', p. 5 or PRIA Global Partnership Paper, 'Impact and Effectiveness of Accountability and Transparency Initiatives: Lessons from South and South East Asia,' no date, p. 7.

[28] R. Mohanty (et al), 'States of Mobilisation? A Comparison of Modes of Interaction Between States and Social Actors in India, Brazil and South Africa', Africa Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, 2010.

[29] M. McNeil and T. Mumvuma, 'Demanding Good Governance…', p. 21.

[30] B. Goldfrank, 'Lessons from Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting', p. 3.

[31] N. Overy, 'The TAC and Budget Advocacy'.

[32] A. Rocha Menocal & B. Sharma, 'Joint Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability: Synthesis Report', ODI, 2008, p. 26.

[33] M. McNeil and T. Mumvuma note that one of the key factors challenging the sustainability of CSOs in Anglophone Africa is the lack of capacity within civil society and government to implement demand-side initiatives. M. McNeil and T. Mumvuma, 'Demanding Good Governance…', p. 4.

[34] J. Gaventa & R. McGee, 'Citizen Action and National Policy Reform', p. 16.

[35] M. Layton, 'Reducing Maternal Mortality in Mexico: Building Vertical Alliances for Change', in J. Gaventa & R. McGee, 'Citizen Action and National Policy', p. 104.

[36] See, for example, M. McNeil and T. Mumvuma, 'Demanding Good Governance…', pp. 10 – 11.

[37] See references for endnote 1.

[38] See, for example, A. Rocha Menocal & B. Sharma, 'Joint Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability …', pp. 45 – 46, 'Donor Consultation on Parliamentary Development and Financial Accountability', DFID, World Bank Institute and UNDP, 2007, p. 16, R. Ahmad, 'Fostering Public Participation in Budget-Making: Case Studies from Indonesia, Marshall Islands, and Pakistan', Asian Development Bank, 2006, p. 66.

[39] 'Donor Consultation on Parliamentary Development and Financial Accountability', p. 13.

[40] A. Rocha Menocal & B. Sharma, 'Joint Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability …', p. 59.

[41] See, for example, J. Heimans, 'Strengthening Participation in Public Expenditure Management: Policy Recommendations for Key Stakeholders', OECD, Policy Brief No. 22, 2002, p. 21, A. Acosta, 'Pilot Programme to Strengthen Parliamentary Oversight of the Extractive Sector in Ghana and Tanzania: Baseline Overview and M&E Report, Revenue Watch Institute, 2009, p. 28.

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[43] 'Donor Consultation on Parliamentary Development and Financial Accountability', p. 16.

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