You Cannot Go it Alone

Learning from Cooperative Relationships in Civil Society Budget Campaigns

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May 2016
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past seven years, the International Budget Partnership (IBP) has generated nearly thirty case studies documenting country-level CSO (civil society organization) budget campaigns across five continents. These case studies describe CSO campaigns to influence government budget processes or policies, and provide lessons on how and why they did or did not achieve their campaign objectives.

This paper reviews these case studies with the aim of distilling lessons and best practices, and synthesizing research findings, particularly with regard to the relationships between and within civil society and other stakeholders relevant to these campaigns. The aim is to draw lessons from the case studies that can be used by to refine IBP’s own strategies and shared with civil society practitioners and other stakeholders that support CSO budget work. Three key questions guided this research:

1. What can we learn from reviewing the types of relationships between CSOs in the case studies?
2. What can we learn from reviewing the types of relationships between CSOs and other stakeholders (such as oversight institutions) in the case studies?
3. When do these two sets of relationships lead to stronger budget outcomes?

CSOs are inherently less powerful than the government stakeholders and officials they seek to influence, because it is these government stakeholders that hold the decision making power. In order to gain more influence over key decisions or decision makers, CSOs frequently work in collaboration with other stakeholders. In every campaign, CSOs seek to influence key government decision makers who have power over what they are trying to change. These are the “targets” of their campaign — the people who they are trying to get to take a particular action or decision. This paper does not review or describe relationships of conflict, or the relationship a CSO might have with the “target” of their campaign (other than to document whether the change was achieved). Instead, it only focuses on the relationships CSOs have with their allies who work with them to achieve their objective. Therefore, where cooperative relationships with state or other oversight actors are described in this paper, it is narrowly focused on collaborative relationships with particular agencies, ministries, and departments that served as an ally or resource for the campaign.

A TYPOLOGY OF CSO CAMPAIGN RELATIONSHIPS

This paper analyzes these cooperative relationships by looking at four main aspects of the relationships that CSOs develop in campaigns: 1) whether cooperation is with state and/or non-state actors; 2) the policy level at which they operate; 3) whether the relationships are “vertical” or “horizontal;” and 4) the intensity of these relationships.
We first distinguish between two levels and directions of CSO relationships in this analysis.

1. **Vertical cooperation** refers to cooperation between actors and institutions operating at different levels of the policy and budget process (international, national, regional, and community).

2. **Horizontal cooperation** refers to cooperation between actors and institutions operating at the same level.

We then consider the intensity of cooperative activities and classify relationships between a CSOs and other actors as either “low” or “high” using the following definitions.

1. **High cooperation** is typified by routine cooperative interactions or meetings, a high level of coordination of activities, regular two-way communication between partners, and relationships that were integral to campaign outcomes.

2. **Low cooperation** is typified by irregular, infrequent, *ad hoc*, or only semi-routine meetings; short-term relationships; limited coordination of activities; irregular communication; and relationships that were not integral to campaign outcomes.

Using these two aspects of campaigns, we developed the following typology of CSO campaign relationships.

1. **Intensive Cooperation**: campaigns which had high levels of cooperation with both non-CSO and state actors and across multiple policy levels.
   This category included eight campaigns: *Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos* (INESC) in Brazil, SEND-Ghana, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) in India, Samarthan in India, the White Ribbon Alliance campaigns in Uganda and Tanzania, and the Human Resources for Health campaign in Uganda.

2. **Elite Cooperation**: campaigns which had horizontal or vertical cooperation with influential national or international stakeholders, in particular with state actors and international donors who wield high levels of influence. These campaigns had relatively low cooperation with other non-state actors, such as civil society.
   This category includes five campaigns: three documenting IBP’s work with national partners and governments to strengthen budget transparency in Honduras, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Afghanistan; two documenting Fundar’s work in Mexico and Integrity Action’s work in Palestine.
3. **Popular Cooperation**: campaigns which had high levels of cooperation between CSOs and other non-state actors, typically at multiple policy levels. These campaigns had little or no cooperation with state actors or institutions. This category included four campaigns: the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa, the Legal Resource Center in South Africa, the Omar Ashgar Khan Development Foundation in Pakistan, and the HakiElimu case in Tanzania.

4. **Limited Cooperation**: campaigns in which the CSO mostly carried out the campaign themselves, with relatively limited, short term or time bound attempts at cooperation with non-state and state stakeholders. These attempts at cooperation and generally also only aimed at a single policy level. This category includes five cases, ACIJ in Argentina, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) Platform in Brazil, Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) in South Africa, Sikika in Tanzania and the Institute of Analysis and Advocacy in Ukraine.

**FINDINGS**

Our main finding is that, when it comes to campaigns, CSOs cannot go it alone. They need either cooperation from elite stakeholders, from a wider network of non-state actors, or both. They must also engage across multiple policy levels to gain enough leverage and power to influence a government unwilling to cooperate. To be successful these relationships must exhibit relatively high levels of cooperation in terms of their strength and intensity. Campaigns that failed to build strong cooperative relationships demonstrated much weaker outcomes. However, the review also found that the forms that cooperative relationships can take are varied.

More specifically we found that:

1. Intensive and popular cooperation campaigns have impact more often than elite and limited cooperation campaigns.
2. Intensive cooperation campaigns are resource intensive and may not be possible when government refuses to engage.
3. Elite cooperation campaigns can have impact in the short term, but they may struggle to achieve sustainable impact and they may be more suitable for campaigns seeking budget process and transparency reforms.
4. Limited cooperation campaigns struggle to achieve impact.
**INTENSIVE COOPERATION CAMPAIGNS**

Intensive cooperation campaigns were successful, particularly where they were monitoring government policies or programs across multiple policy levels. However, working with many stakeholders on many levels requires funding and a large amount of technical, logistical, managerial, and human resources. Many organizations lack these resources. The Fundar case in Mexico is a good example of an organization that tried to cooperate vertically but lacked the skills, experience, and resources to do so. Further, cooperating with organizations that have differing ideas on the goals or methods to be used can also create friction which, as was seen in the BNDES Platform case, can undermine a campaign. CSOs need to reflect on the capacity, the resources at their disposal, and the aims of their campaign when considering which stakeholders to engage with at which level. They also need to consider whether they have the resources and capacity to build and manage these relationships.

**ELITE COOPERATION CAMPAIGNS**

It is not always necessary to work at every policy level. The cases of elite cooperation demonstrate cooperative relationships with government stakeholders or other elite actors, such as donors (particularly in aid dependent countries), can be highly effective. In some cases this can lead to rapid change. For example, cases in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Honduras, where IBP and national stakeholders worked directly with finance ministries, demonstrated that changes can be achieved quickly where the government is receptive to this change, despite the campaign’s more limited engagement or cooperation with other non-state actors.

We also found that elite cooperation can be formal or informal in nature. Cases of formal cooperation, for example in Ghana and Palestine where there was a formal partnership or a memorandum of understanding (MoU), can facilitate access to information and legitimize the work of CSOs. However, formal relationships only work insofar as there is some degree of good will and cooperative spirit. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the ACIJ case demonstrates that a formal mechanism created to monitor implementation of an agreement floundered because these formal relationships become contentious. ACIJ made more progress when they left the formal setting and began using other tactics and strategies to mobilize non-state actors to enforce the agreement. Other examples demonstrate where informal collaborations were highly effective. These include contributions that were made informally to the Uganda Human Rights for Health campaign and the Dalit Rights Campaign, as well as information that was leaked to the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa.
POPULAR COOPERATION CAMPAIGNS

The popular cooperation campaigns demonstrate that, where government is not cooperative with civil society, or is hostile, broadening and deepening relationships with other non-state actors (both vertically and horizontally) becomes imperative. Where government cooperation was low, only those campaigns that had high cooperation with other non-state actors were relatively successful. Where there is little or no cooperation with government, CSOs must join forces and leverage their mutual strengths to increase their relative power and influence. Cases in South Africa and Pakistan demonstrated the power of bringing people together to advocate for their rights through vertical accountability.
1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past seven years, the International Budget Partnership (IBP) has generated nearly thirty case studies documenting civil society budget work in countries spanning five continents. These case studies describe civil society campaigns to influence government budget processes or policies, and distill lessons on how and why they did or did not achieve their campaign objectives. Each study used a common qualitative methodology developed by IBP and sought to document the case in depth. They explored not only the activities undertaken in the campaign, and any changes in government behavior, institutions, or rules it contributed to, but also how and why certain campaigns did or did not have an impact.

IBP has reviewed these case studies with the aim of distilling lessons and best practices, and synthesizing research findings, particularly with regard to the relationships between and within civil society and other stakeholders relevant to these campaigns. The aim is to draw lessons from the case studies that can be used by IBP to refine its own strategies and shared with civil society practitioners and other stakeholders that support CSO budget work.

Three key questions guided this research:

1. What can we learn from reviewing the types of relationships between civil society organizations in the case studies?
2. What can we learn from reviewing the types of relationships between civil society and other stakeholders (such as oversight institutions) in the case studies?
3. When do these two sets of relationships lead to stronger budget outcomes?

In answering these questions, the paper will proceed as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 provides a brief review of the methodology. Section 3 describes the relationships under review and defines four categories of cooperation: 1) intensive cooperation, 2) elite cooperation, 3) popular cooperation, and 4) limited cooperation. In doing so it considers the level, directionality, and intensity of these cooperative relationships. Section 4 summarizes the key findings for each of four relationship categories. Each of the four categories are explained, in

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1 IBP defines “impact” as changes in government behavior or rules for behavior with regard to the budget, specifically changes in budget policy or budget process. Budget policy refers to all actions or decisions that have an impact on how much money is raised or spent on a given budget item. This includes changes in taxation, budget allocations, and budget implementation. Budget process refers to changes to how budget policy decisions are made. This includes changes in who participates in these decisions (budget participation) and changes in how government reports on budget policy (budget transparency). Budget process impacts include changes to practices, as well as the formal and informal rules or institutions that govern those practices.
depth examples are provided, and the key findings are summarized. Section 5 summarizes the key findings and concludes.

A recent six country research project by IBP and GIZ found that examples of cooperation between CSOs and other actors in the accountability system are exceptions rather than an indication of a new normal. The paper also finds that such an “ecosystem approach” could have important advantages over more traditional approaches to accountability. Our paper will try to understand existing examples of cooperation between CSOs and other actors. Understanding these relationships will make it easier for IBP and others to support their development.

2. METHODOLOGY

The study used qualitative methodology. The set of IBP case studies are the primary materials from which data was extracted, and additional literature and reports were reviewed to provide context.

The first step was to create a final list of the IBP cases to be included in the review work. A preliminary list of all potential IBP case studies was drawn up, and then criteria were developed to determine inclusion or exclusion in the review. It was agreed that to be included a case study must review a discrete civil society campaign that has a specific budget objective as defined by IBP. These budget objectives include: 1) changing government spending or revenue generation, for example by increasing the resource allocation to a specific program or changing tax policies; 2) improving the effectiveness of government budget implementation, for example by improving accountability in service delivery; or 3) improving budget transparency through greater access to timely, high-quality budget information.

The review excluded case studies which were incomplete or did not look at a specific campaign as defined above. Using these criteria, the review included 23 case studies from 13 countries spread across five continents, all of which were completed between 2010 and 2015. A final list of the cases can be found in Annex 1.

The next step was to review the content of each individual case. We created a matrix to inform the review of each of the cases and to distill as much information as possible from them. Detailed notes were taken on topics including the background, objective, timeline, type and descriptions of relationships, outcomes, tactics and strategies, collection and use of evidence, and engagement with the media. Finally, we looked specifically at the CSO and accountability actor relationships and key variables pertinent for this review, and summarized these in a

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3 In some cases, the “objective” may be something more long term, such as improving health service delivery. However, if this was to be achieved by, for example, increasing the health budget allocation for health workers then there is a specific “budget objective” as per the IBP criteria.
new data matrix. Cases were compared to distill themes, patterns, and differences, and ultimately grouped into
categories.

There are a number of limitations to this review. First, we selected the case studies according to the extent to
which they provide analysis material for learning about how CSO campaigns work. This biased the sample towards
successful campaigns because they provided more extensive analysis material — many unsuccessful campaigns
failed simply because they were not fully implemented, thus limiting material for analysis. Cases where campaigns
were not completed or did not define clear objectives were therefore excluded. Where they did provide rich
enough analysis material, a number of unsuccessful or partially successful campaigns were however also included.4

Second, although the cases broadly followed the same methodology developed by IBP, some of the cases were
retrospective while others followed campaigns in real time as they were implemented. Some of the retrospective
cases also described completed campaigns while others described ongoing campaigns. Also, all the cases were
undertaken by different researchers who were allowed, within the overall framework, to adjust the methodology
as they saw fit and developed their own interview and data collections tools, as well as analysis and report
formats. Thus the cases differ in what information they contain and what is missing, and gaps in the data reflect
this. Finally, we are limited to using only the information presented in the written case studies and do not know,
and cannot report on, how the situation may have changed or evolved since the original case was written.

The conceptualization and writing of this paper was guided by a reference group that consisted of IBP staff and
representatives of IBP CSO partners: Gertrude Mugizi (PSAM), Albert van Zyl and Paolo de Renzio (IBP), Gustavo
Moreno (ACIJ), Yogesh Kumar (Samarthan).

3. OVERVIEW OF RELATIONSHIPS

CSOs are inherently less powerful than the government stakeholders and officials they seek to influence, because
it is these government stakeholders that hold the decision making power. In order to gain more influence over key
decisions or decision makers, CSOs frequently work in collaboration with other stakeholders. This paper analyzes
these cooperative relationships by looking at three main factors that help understand the types of cooperative
relationships CSOs develop in campaigns: 1) whether cooperation is with state and/or non-state actors, 2) the
policy level at which they operate and whether the relationships are “vertical” or “horizontal,” and 3) the intensity
of these relationships.

4 This would include cases like Sikika and Ibase.
Excluded from this analysis is the question of which tactics and strategies CSOs used to develop these relationships in their campaigns. While this will be touched upon in this paper (for example where building relationships and mobilizing the grassroots is itself a strategy), further research on this specific topic is planned as a follow on to this work.

3.1 COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

We are interested in learning about when campaigns are likely to be successful and what lessons can be distilled to apply to future campaigns. Therefore, the relationships described in this review refer to cases where stakeholders with a similar interest cooperate in some capacity to increase their chances of achieving their shared interest. This means that the cooperative relationships described here are those with “allies.” Allies typically work together on a well-defined issue or goal, over a specified period of time, and with a specific aim of influencing a policy or decision maker.

There are a wide variety of state and non-state actors with whom CSOs might cooperate on a campaign. Non-state actors include donors, international or national non government organizations (NGOs), research institutes, think tanks, universities, professional associations, labor organizations, the media, religious organizations or leaders, community based organizations, social movements or political organizations, amongst others. Similarly, there are many different potential state actors with whom CSOs might consider cooperating (see Box 1).

In every campaign, CSOs seek to influence key government decision makers who have power over what they are trying to change. These are the “targets” of their campaign — the people who they are trying to get to take a particular action or decision. For example, creating new legislation or a new budget policy decision, revising program implementation arrangements, and so on. This paper does not review or describe relationships of conflict, or the relationship a CSO might have with the “target” of their campaign (other than to document whether the change was achieved). Instead, it only focuses on the relationships they have with their allies, who work with them to achieve their objective.
BOX 1. COOPERATING WITH STATE ACTORS

There are many different agencies, ministries, departments or elected officials that CSOs can consider engaging cooperatively in their campaigns. Some of these are listed below.

**Ministries, Departments and Agencies:** CSOs frequently find allies within ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). These official government institutions may have incentives to cooperate with CSOs where their interests are aligned. This cooperation may be formal, for example through steering committees, information requests or formal submission processes, or informal, for example where they informally share information, or assist with strategies. Some of the incentives for cooperation might be where CSOs can provide technical assistance, capacity building or undertake research that the MDA lacks the capacity to do on their own. CSOs, with “on the ground” presence may also be able to assist MDAs in independently monitoring program implementation to enhance effective service delivery. Where MDAs have been trying to increase their budget envelope or advocate for increased accountability (which can be politically sensitive), CSOs can also be allies and take on advocacy work that might otherwise be judged as overtly political.

**Formal Oversight Institutions:** Countries have many different oversight institutions and CSOs have successfully engaged with these on their campaigns. Examples include Supreme Audit Institutions, Human Rights Commissions, Anti-Corruption or Ethics institutions, Ombudsmen, Crime Directorates and other independent bodies.

**Political Institutions and Elected Officials:** In many cases, CSOs are able to identify sympathetic elected officials as allies in their campaign. This may be individuals or committees within national or local legislatures.

**Legal Institutions:** In some cases, CSOs use legal advocacy as a tool in their campaigns. This might mean using freedom of information laws to access information, or using the court system to demand for their rights. These systems are independent and highly regulated institutions, therefore they can’t “cooperate” per se with CSOs. However, using legal institutions in a campaign can often be a helpful strategy and tool for civil society.

Therefore, where cooperative relationships with state or other oversight actors are described in this paper, we narrowly focus on collaborative relationships with particular ministries, departments, and agencies that served as an ally or resource for the campaign.

As will be demonstrated in the cases, the state is not a monolithic entity, but a diverse set of institutions, agencies, and actors with differing interests and priorities. Thus, while CSO campaigns may have a specific government target, in many cases they simultaneously engage cooperatively with other state institutions or elected officials.
For example, IBP and local partners worked closely with finance ministries in both in Afghanistan and Honduras, providing them with technical assistance and support. In Brazil, Inesc worked to block a regressive tax reform and engaged multiple government stakeholders, including the federal prosecutor who they requested to intervene in the situation. The prosecutor was responsive and sent a written notification to several relevant government ministers, the President of the Senate, and the President of the Chamber of Deputies demanding that they explain the bill and its impact to assess the constitutionality of the proposal. In Ghana, SEND-Ghana worked with the government on a nationwide program and ultimately secured a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for civil society to officially monitor program implementation. This cooperation also allowed them to work with local government and to access information that greatly helped their campaign. Other cases demonstrate that CSOs have found ways to engage cooperatively with line ministries, such as the education, finance, and health ministries, with elected officials, such as members of parliament (MPs) and city mayors, and with other oversight institutions, such as the auditor and anti-corruption bodies.

3.2 POLICY “LEVEL” AND DIRECTIONALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS

To better understand cooperative relationships, we consider the “level” and directionality of relationships. This distinction is helpful to understand how different campaigns are organized based on the issues they are trying to address. We distinguish between two levels in this analysis.

1. **Vertical cooperation** refers to cooperation between actors and institutions operating at different levels of the policy and budget process (international, national, regional, community).

2. **Horizontal cooperation** refers to cooperation between actors and institutions operating at the same level."

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In Figure 1, the “lead organization” at the national level refers to the primary CSO organizing and coordinating the campaign. In this scenario, there is a non-state partner (an international NGO) at the international level, state and non-state partners at both the national and the local level, as well as grassroots community engagement. “Vertical cooperation” refers to a situation where the lead organization is cooperating upward with international organizations or downward with local or community level organizations. “Horizontal cooperation” refers to a situation where the lead organization is cooperating with others operating at the same level — in this case at the national level, such as with elected officials, ministries or agencies, the media, and other CSOs.

Fox developed the language of “vertically integrated policy monitoring” and “vertical integration” to describe the “coordination of policy monitoring and public interest advocacy efforts across different ‘levels’ of the policy process, from the local to the national and transnational arenas.” For the purposes of this analysis, this idea is extremely helpful in thinking about how organizations can work across levels. In our review of cases we found that when describing these relationships in practice, “integration” is too strong a word for the types of relationships that typically exist. In practice CSOs tend to cooperate with other stakeholders on a limited set of common interests for defined periods of time and with a specific aim of influencing a policy or decision maker. This is

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particularly true when looking at the entire ecosystem of accountability actors (including government accountability institutions who operate independently as per their mandate), with whom “integration” is not feasible. We have therefore adopted the terms “vertical cooperation” and “horizontal cooperation” to distinguish what we have found from the “integrated policy monitoring.”

3.3 INTENSITY OF COOPERATION

To understand the relationships between and within stakeholder groups in the context of a campaign, it is important to consider the intensity of cooperative activities. Intensity is comprised of the nature of cooperative activities, their type, frequency, and the number of stakeholders relevant to the campaign. Not all cooperative activities are equally intense. They can range from ad hoc opportunistic cooperation, like when a sympathetic official leaks a government document to a campaign, to institutionalized cooperation, like the SEND-Ghana example where the government and CSOs signed a MoU regulating their relationship.

To synthesize the findings across all 23 cases, and to compare and classify the relationships within the cases, we developed a simplified categorization model. Therefore, relationships between a CSOs and other actors were classified as either “low” or “high” using the following definitions.

- **High cooperation** is typified by routine cooperative interactions or meetings, a high level of coordination of activities, regular two-way communication between partners, and relationships that were integral to campaign outcomes.

- **Low cooperation** is typified by irregular, infrequent, ad hoc, or only semi-routine meetings; short-term relationships; limited coordination of activities; irregular communication; and relationships that were not integral to campaign outcomes.

In most campaigns relationships evolved over time. A degree of generalization that looks at the campaign and the relationships as a whole is therefore necessary to classify whether the relationship constitutes high or low cooperation. Consequently, even if a campaign had a short period of high cooperation, it was not classified as high unless this was continuous throughout the majority of the campaign. Each campaign was therefore classified based on the average level of cooperation (low or high) with other non-state and state actors throughout the campaign.
Using this classification, four broad categories of relationships emerged. (See Annex 2 for a summary table of how the individual case studies were classified.)

1. **Intensive Cooperation**: campaigns which had high levels of cooperation with both non-state and state actors across multiple policy levels.\(^{10}\)

2. **Elite Cooperation**: campaigns which had horizontal or vertical cooperation with influential national or international stakeholders, in particular with state actors and international donors who wield high levels of influence. These campaigns had relatively low cooperation with other non-state actors, such as civil society.

3. **Popular Cooperation**: campaigns which had high levels of cooperation between CSOs and other non-state actors, typically at multiple policy levels. These campaigns had little or no cooperation with state actors or institutions.

4. **Limited Cooperation**: campaigns in which the CSO mostly carried out the campaign themselves, with relatively limited, short term or time bound attempts at cooperation with non-state and state stakeholders.

4. **A REVIEW OF RELATIONSHIPS IN IBP CASE STUDIES**

This section explores in detail the relationship categories identified in the previous section (intensive, elite, popular, and limited). We provide an in depth description of the category, provide examples of cases in the category, and summarize key lessons arising from the categorization. Due to the volume of cases included in the review, not all are discussed in detail here. Readers interested in learning more about a particular category can refer back to the individual case studies.

4.1 **INTENSIVE COOPERATION: HIGH COOPERATION WITH NON-STATE AND STATE ACTORS**

A number of cases demonstrated high levels of cooperation between CSOs and non-state actors, as well as government stakeholders. These campaigns engaged a broad range of state and non-state stakeholders both

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\(^{10}\) These are campaigns that Jonathan Fox might refer to as “highly integrated.”
vertically (across multiple policy levels) and horizontally (within each level). Examples cases of intensive cooperation are described below.

SEND-Ghana worked to monitor the Ghana School Feeding Program (GSFP), a social protection program with the dual motivation of improving nutrition and boosting local farming. The program aimed to reduce extreme poverty by providing children in public primary schools and kindergartens in the poorest areas of the country with one nutritious meal per day using locally grown foodstuffs. To ensure the effective implementation of the program, and to maximize its impact on school children and local farmers, SEND-Ghana decided to monitor how it was being implemented across policy levels. They then aimed to report back to the national level to get program revisions or changes if necessary.

SEND-Ghana’s monitoring efforts engaged 50 district assemblies, 50 CSOs, and 50 District Highly Indebted Poor Countries/Citizens Monitoring Committees (DCMC) in seven regions across the country. These efforts spanned the community, district, regional, and national levels and also engaged international donors.

At the community level the work included community sensitization, collecting information on program implementation at the school level, and feedback meetings with leaders at the community and district level to seek commitments for reform. At the district level, a focal CSO worked with a DCMC, which was drawn from stakeholders or interest groups, such as the local government and traditional authorities, faith-based organizations, women’s groups, farmer-based organizations, and youth groups among others. At the regional level, they also formulated a Regional Program Monitoring & Evaluation (PM&E) Network, which consisted of CSOs, members of the DCMC, as well as representatives of regional associations for women in trade, persons with disabilities, and representatives from the Regional Economic Planning Unit. At the national level, they had a PM&E Network with a similar composition of members, as well as representatives of the Ministry of Local Government, SEND-Ghana, and other interested stakeholders, such as CSOs. SEND-Ghana’s role on independent monitoring of the GSFP was further institutionalized through a formal MoU with the program’s national secretariat, which facilitated access to information and fostered close working relationships with all levels of local government and agencies responsible for the implementation of the program.

Using the monitoring reports, which were independently verified to ensure credibility, SEND-Ghana was able to identify areas of the program that required reform. The government took action in a number of ways at the national and subnational levels to improve program performance. For example, responding to issues identified by SEND-Ghana, in July 2009 the Minister of Local Government and Rural Development committed to ensuring that local-level institutions under the program were established and equipped to carry out their roles and responsibilities. The minister also committed to prioritizing schools in deprived communities for future expansions of the GSFP and improving institutional collaboration between the various participating ministries, implementing
agencies, and key program actors within the communities, to advance service delivery. A number of other reforms were also undertaken at the national, regional, and community levels to improve program implementation as a result of the issues identified in their monitoring reports.

The White Ribbon Alliance Uganda (WRA-Ug) launched the “Act Now to Save Mothers” campaign with the aim of getting the Ugandan government to fulfill its maternal health care commitments. Health care in Uganda has been devolved to the district level, so government actions needed to be taken at both the district and the national levels to fulfil this commitment. Accordingly, as Figure 2 shows, WRA-Ug worked at both the district and the national levels to engage and influence different stakeholders.

Figure 2. The White Ribbon Alliance Uganda Campaign Overview

Source: Developed by the author. Notes: BEmONC refers to “Basic Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care,” EmONC refers to “Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care,” and TWGs refers to “Technical Working Groups”.

The campaign adopted a highly participatory approach from the beginning. WRA-Ug engaged a broad cross section of stakeholders during every phase, including campaign planning, data collection and analysis, and implementation. Indeed, WRA-Ug hosted planning meetings with MPs, civil society representatives, professional associations, health officials, health activists, and others, to define the goals, strategy, and targets of their campaign. Given resource limitations they decided to engage in only three counties, but selected these from different regions. As Figure 3 shows, this led them to engage with communities and health workers at the level of the health center, district leaders, elected officials, civil society representatives, and many district officials, such as the district health officer. All of these stakeholders participated in the highly participatory assessment of maternal health care services in centers across the three districts. The evidence they gathered was therefore considered credible and had high levels of buy-in.

Using this evidence, the WRA-Ug organized district launch events, petitions, and encouraged media and elected officials to take this issue up. They undertook similar activities at the national level, sharing their results with the health ministry, other CSOs, and the media. Ultimately officials from all three districts presented petitions to the national parliament, which responded by ordering the Committee on Health to investigate. At the time the case study was written, the committee had already visited two of the districts to confirm these findings. Many changes also occurred at the district level as a result of the campaign. For example one district decided to recruit more doctors; in most districts, additional budget resources were allocated to maternal and child health in the 2014/15 financial year. This may have resulted in improvement of service delivery in some areas. Although the campaign had not been completed when the case study was written, it also seemed to be making progress on increasing the national budget for non-wage primary health care spending.
FIGURE 3. INTENSIVE COOPERATION

Source: Developed by the author.
The case of Samarthan in India is another example of where vertical and horizontal cooperation was beneficial. Under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) campaign, Samarthan wanted to advance program implementation by encouraging more public participation and improving social audit functions.  

They conducted two campaigns. They began by working in only in two Indian districts (five villages in each) but, given the limited scope of this campaign, higher level officials dismissed their findings as anomalies. This initial campaign also provoked a backlash: NGREGA activities stopped in the villages where they had been working and Samarthan staff received threats. For the second campaign they decided that they needed much broader engagement. Through their network of CSO allies, Samarthan began campaigning in ten districts and trained 1,600 youth from 800 panchayats (local level) on social audits. The larger scale helped legitimize the results of their work, since they could no longer be dismissed as anomalies or trivialized. Engaging youth provided still more legitimacy, since the most extreme poor and disempowered couldn’t confront officials on corruption. According to the case findings “[i]n the end it was Samarthan’s ability to engage with multiple levels (village, district, state, and federal) of government using multiple strategies (research, community mobilization, and media) that played a vital role in its success. It also managed to work with sympathetic and unsympathetic officials alike, adjusting its strategies accordingly.”

A number of observations emerge from reviewing the nature and the type of relationships that exist between CSOs and other actors. In some instances, a CSO must cooperate vertically. This occurs where the institutional structure that relates to the issue they are trying to address takes place at multiple policy levels, and the CSO does not have equivalent capacity at each of these levels. For example, SEND-Ghana’s campaign aims to improve service delivery for a national program. This program has an institutional design and financial arrangements that provide cross cutting responsibilities and implementation of activities at various different policy levels. It is also being implemented across a wide geographic area. SEND-Ghana does not have the necessary staff, resources and offices across all of these levels. Thus, in order to be effective, SEND-Ghana must work across policy levels, but given its own capacity limitations, must do so through broad cooperation at each level. This is also true in the case of WRA-Ug, where action was required at the health center, district, and national levels. Similarly, the Samarthan campaign for MGNREGA was focused on the implementation of a national level program within their particular region. Thus, all of these cases required that the CSOs cooperate with numerous stakeholders across policy levels.

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12 Ramesh Awasthi, “Samarthan’s Campaign to Improve Implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India [published December 2011, Updated November 2013]” (International Budget Partnership, November 2013),  
However, in other instances, vertical cooperation was deployed where a CSO was trying to address a policy issue at only one level, but they chose to use vertical cooperation as a strategy to increase their influence. For example, in the Uganda Human Resources for Health case study, civil society aimed to get the national government to allocate more resources for health workers. The required change only needed to occur at the national level. However, in order to increase the amount of pressure on the relevant decision makers at the national level, CSOs engaged in mass mobilization across policy levels, mobilizing the grassroots, professional associations, and other non-state actors to apply a high amount of pressure to national decision makers. This mass mobilization and engagement also later helped them to monitor the implementation of the outcomes (hiring and staffing of health workers) since participants at lower levels were able to monitor and report back to the national level.

These cases also demonstrate the power of broad horizontal cooperation, across a particular policy level. For example, the Samarthan case demonstrates how building broader cooperative relationships with other non-state actors across wider geographic areas (expanding from two to ten districts in the second phase of the campaign), can further foster legitimacy for a campaign and improve outcomes. When they expanded to a wider geographic area, it became more difficult for the government to dispute their findings. It can also decrease the risks or pressure on individual CSOs participating in campaigns. Mobilizing more non-state actors at the same level can apply more pressure to relevant government decision makers. For example, in its Dalit rights campaign, the NCDHR was able to engage with a national network of Dalit activists, CSOs, researchers, and intellectuals, which brought legitimacy and authority to their campaign. Broadening horizontal cooperation with more actors can also help to diversify the skillset of stakeholders engaged on the campaign and maximize the relationships that different organizations may have. For example, the Human Resource for Health Campaign in Uganda was only successful thanks to the mixture of skills in legal advocacy, media engagement, political engagement, grassroots mobilization, and budget analysis – skills which no single organization possessed.

A number of cases also demonstrate the value of fostering cooperative relationships with government across policy levels. In the WRA-Ug example, cooperation with local leaders, health workers, and district officials in Uganda during the inception and assessment phase of the campaign ensured that everyone agreed with the key challenges facing the sector and the actions required to address these. In the SEND-Ghana case, cooperation with government officials across all policy levels helped them to overcome the difficulties of accessing information and, at the regional level, they were able to provide officials with avenues for reporting the challenges that they faced in the program that they would not normally have been able to do anything about.

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Ultimately, all of these campaigns achieved relatively successful outcomes and demonstrate how highly cooperative campaigns which engage a broad range of stakeholders across multiple policy levels can be successful. However, these types of campaigns also require a high degree of coordination, organization, technical expertise, and funding, since mobilizing so many stakeholders, particularly at the grassroots, is expensive. Many CSOs do not have access to the funding and networks needed to implement such a strategy.

The next section explores cases that were equally successful, but that limited their engagement to focus only on cooperation with government stakeholders or upwards to international organizations. While much less costly, these campaigns may only work in a more limited set of circumstances.

4.2 ELITE COOPERATION: HIGH COOPERATION WITH STATE OR INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND LOW COOPERATION WITH NATIONAL OR SUBNATIONAL NON-STATE ACTORS

Where CSOs have been able to identify powerful allies within the government or the international donor community (particularly in highly aid dependent countries where donors have significant influence), and those allies have sufficient influence at the policy level where change needs to occur, campaigns have sometimes been successful. This holds true even when the campaigns have had relatively low engagement or cooperation with other non-state actors. Two examples highlight how CSOs or international NGOs can form productive partnerships with national or local government.

In the Health, Citizenship, and Human Rights Advocacy Initiative case study, Fundar, a Mexican CSO undertook a campaign to improve access to, and availability of, health services for socially excluded groups in Mexico. The campaign initially set out to be highly integrated across policy levels, with cooperation from the national to local level, by working with local CSOs at the community level to monitor the provision of services at health facilities. However, during the first year of the campaign, Fundar realized that their goals were not clearly defined and were too ambitious. They also realized that their local partnerships were not working out the way that they had hoped. In the second year, they honed their objectives and targets. They decided to prioritize work on amending the federal health budget, where they had more experience, and work to improve the transparency and accountability of social protection spending. The refined strategy mainly focused their cooperative activities at the national level with the legislature, in particular with the Health Committee and the Budget and Accounts Committee, and to maintain a permanent presence there. Through this collaboration they also jointly organized a forum “For a Universal and Comprehensive Health Care” with the Health Committee. In the third year of the campaign, they

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further strengthened relationships with the legislature and were also able to strengthen their relationship with the CNPSS (Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud). This helped them to develop more concrete proposals for the legislature and gain more traction. Despite the fact that the vertical cooperation with other CSOs had not succeeded, Fundar ultimately began to achieve incremental success in their campaign areas thanks to their technical analysis and the strong relationships that they built with key government stakeholders. This case demonstrates how building strong cooperative relationships with government stakeholders (as they become possible) can help achieve outcomes, although they may be incremental.

In another example from Palestine, the Teacher Creativity Center and Integrity Action formed a partnership with the education ministry to engage students, teachers, and supervisors in monitoring local service delivery projects. This partnership had mixed results, but presents a strong example of where collaborative relationships with government and international NGOs can be useful.\(^{17}\)

Three more case studies worth exploring are the three countries — Honduras, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Afghanistan — where IBP has worked with a local CSO to improve budget transparency at the national level.\(^{18}\) The goal of these activities only impacted one policy level, the national. In each case, IBP provided training, financial assistance, and technical support to a local CSO to collect data for the Open Budget Survey (OBS). The OBS in the only “independent, comparative, and regular assessment of government budget transparency and accountability around the world... the Survey assesses how much timely and useful budget information governments ... make publicly available, and how accountable budget systems are in terms of the strength of official oversight institutions and levels of public participation.”\(^{19}\) The OBS then computes a score as part of the Open Budget Index based on the findings of the survey and ranks countries based on the outcomes of this score.\(^{20}\)

In each of these three cases, IBP worked closely with the national level partner to collect the data and then complete a number of dissemination trainings and meetings, for example training of journalists or civil society on budget issues, launch events with civil society and a series of meetings with government ministries, in particular the finance ministry. In all three countries, IBP and the local partner identified highly receptive finance officials who were able and willing to change the quantity, frequency, and type of budget information that would be made publicly available at the national level. Each country made changes and ultimately improved budget transparency, as measured through the OBI. In most cases the national partner also engaged in some form of budget

\(^{17}\) Belal Fallah, “Student Audits of Public Services in Palestine” (International Budget Partnership, December 2015).


\(^{19}\) Pino, “The Impact of the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Survey and Its Partner Institutions’ Advocacy on Budget Transparency in Honduras.” p.1

transparency training with local CSOs or subnational government stakeholders, but that was not usually focused on achieving the national level results.

The three IBP OBS cases had much in common. All three are post-conflict or post-coup countries suffering from significant budget shortfalls and, not coincidentally, highly dependent on international aid. All were undergoing some form of broader public financial management (PFM) reforms financed and supported by international donors. This created an opportunity where there were active donors interested in continuing to improve PFM. IBP also lent legitimacy to the campaigns, given the organization is well known to donors and likely had easier access to these stakeholders than would other CSOs. In these cases, it was likely this international recognition and legitimacy that fostered inroads for the CSOs to create cooperative relationships with the national governments and international donors. In these cases, CSOs have a strong incentive to have “upwards” cooperation with government and donors because, through their financing, they have significant leverage over fragile, or aid-dependents governments.

For example, in the case of Honduras, IBP and CIPRODEH (El Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos), a Honduran civil society partner, sought to improve budget transparency. Honduras was included in the 2010 iteration of the OBS and the results were covered widely in the media, which caught the attention of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Honduras had previously been made ineligible for MCC funding, but the MCC was in the process of again reviewing eligibility. In March 2011, the MCC reached an agreement with the government on a new policy plan to improve fiscal transparency, amongst other criteria, and that the OBS would be one of the key indicators to measure progress. The MCC also agreed to finance IBP and a local partner to do an evaluation of Honduras’ budget transparency developments between September 2009 (the cutoff date of the Open Budget Survey 2010) and August 2011. This partnership between IBP, the local civil society partner, and the MCC gave significant incentives for the government to increase budget transparency. Indeed, hoping for renewed MCC funding, the government worked with IBP to create and carry out a plan to publish more budget information and improve their score. As Figure 4 shows, despite relatively limited relationships within civil society at the national level and virtually no engagement at the subnational level, the plan was successful.
Donors also used the OBS data in Afghanistan, and committed to channeling up to 50 percent of their funds through the budget on the condition that the government improve its OBI score and increase its spending capacity. This created an extremely strong incentive for the finance ministry to cooperate IBP and its local partner.\textsuperscript{21}

In the short term, all of these campaigns have proven effective at their stated goals, for example at expanding budget transparency and access to budget information for citizens. These campaigns have also provided significant technical assistance, information, training, experience, and support to CSOs and national government stakeholders, and likely increased their capacity to undertake this type of work independently in the future. These cases demonstrate that campaigns can have successful outcomes where CSOs cooperate closely with influential government and international stakeholders, even where there is not broad cooperation with other CSOs or non-state actors. This may be particularly the case where think tanks, research institutes, and other technical

\textsuperscript{21} Bizhan, “Budget Transparency in Afghanistan: A Pathway to Building Public Trust in the State.” (International Budget Partnership, n.d.)
organizations can build credible evidence and sustain cooperative relationships with government stakeholders, and where these stakeholders have strong incentives (such as financial) to cooperate or, at a minimum, receive new analysis or technical support.

However, in the longer term, cooperative relationships that are limited to working with national government and international stakeholders raise questions about the sustainability of these reforms. Cooperative engagement with a national government which is predicated on an individual’s interest, or because of international influence, may be more susceptible to political shifts than a broader form of engagement. This is because there may be fewer national or local stakeholders who have the leverage to ensure continuous engagement and/or monitor implementation of these changes and ensure their sustainability.

**BOX 2. IBP AND AFGHANISTAN**

IBP engaged in Afghanistan by sending a communication to the finance ministry about potentially undertaking the OBS and identifying a local partner. After undertaking the first year of the OBS in 2008, and Afghanistan scoring just 8 out of 100 on the OBI, IBP and their local partner engaged with the finance ministry to help them understand how to improve their score.

At the time, Afghanistan was the most aid-dependent country in the world, with aid financing 100 per cent of the development budget and 40 per cent of the operating budget. International funding was mostly provided as “off-budget” support. Between 2001 and 2010, only about 15 percent of foreign aid was channeled through the budget. Donors in the country were struggling with accountability and public resource management, and saw the OBI as a tool against which they could measure progress against the 2008 results. Thus, in 2010, donors committed to channeling up to 50 percent of their funds through the budget on the condition that the government make its budget more transparent as measured by the OBI, and that it increase its spending capacity. The government created an action plan on budget transparency which was integrated into the PFM Roadmap and donors provided significant technical assistance. Ultimately, this resulted in significantly improved results: Afghanistan’s OBI score was 21 out of 100 in 2010, and rose to 59 in 2012. This was indicative of their move to make budget documents more available in response to IBP’s work in this area.

Many of the other case studies examined as part of this review show that it can be extremely challenging for CSOs to create cooperative relationships with government. The three OBS case studies may be unique in that they demonstrate the disproportionate influence that a well-known and credible international organization like IBP can play. This is particularly evident in more fluid post-conflict environments where many governance reforms are already under way and where donors are very active and relatively influential. CSOs in these environments, much
Like the state itself, typically have relatively limited capacity. In the three cases, CSOs were dependent on the funding and technical support from IBP to carry out the work. In all of these cases, it was donors who held the most leverage. The incentives/disincentives that donors used were likely the biggest contributor to change.

Donors have many tools available to influence government decisions that are not typically available to CSOs. For example, a donor can withhold (or threaten to withhold) funds or make future funding contingent on the government undertaking policy reforms or specific actions (such as revising an operational manual or tightening fiscal regulations). A donor can also use results-based financing mechanisms, provide technical assistance, and support best practices.

A donors’ leverage stems from the fact that they have resources as well as technical knowledge and support to offer, threaten to cut off, or cut off to governments with limited or weak capacity due to being poor, fragile, or conflict-affected states. These tools are particularly influential on government behavior or actions in poor, post-conflict, fragile or highly indebted countries that are dependent on external donors.

Beyond exerting direct pressure on governments, donors also have many other tools available to support CSO campaigns. They can directly fund civil society work, help facilitate access to information on donor financed programs, provide technical support or training, and take measures to legitimize CSO work by, for example, co-publishing, promoting, adopting, or raising the results of a CSO report with the government.

Donors can also benefit from collaborative activities with civil society. Research by CSOs can offer independent positions or points of view, allowing donors to raise issues with government which might otherwise be too sensitive. In many cases CSOs are also more closely tied to the grassroots and community levels. CSOs therefore may have access to different types of information than donors, and be able to take direct action on issues to exert pressure that donors cannot (for example mobilizing people, lobbying, etc.).

When donors are engaged, CSOs may be required to limit themselves to a more cooperative approach with government. This may be because donors need to closely guard their relationship with governments.

In summary, CSOs can achieve significant campaign impacts when they are able to foster cooperative relationships with national governments. In some cases, international donors, or international NGOs, may be able to support local CSOs to foster these relationships or increase the amount of leverage they wield, for example by incentivizing compliance through future funding.

However, this is not always the case. As will be demonstrated in the next section, in many cases CSOs decide not to enter into cooperative relationships with government. Or, despite multiple and repeated attempts, are not able to
identify cooperative partners within the government, simply because government stakeholders are unreceptive to these interventions. In these cases, CSOs are reliant on working more closely with other non-state actors to achieve their objectives.

4.3 POPULAR COOPERATION: HIGH COOPERATION WITH NON-STATE ACTORS, LOW COOPERATION WITH STATE ACTORS

CSOs that do not succeed at identifying powerful allies within the government, or choose not to follow this route, must find other avenues or methods to influence government decision makers. A number of the IBP case studies document attempts by CSOs to engage constructively with government stakeholders without (or with extremely limited) success. These include two cases in South Africa — the Treatment Action Campaign’s (TAC) work on improving access to anti-retroviral treatment, and the South African Legal Resources Centre (LRC) campaign for adequate educational facilities.²²,²³ It also includes the Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation’s campaign for earthquake reconstruction in Pakistan, and HakiElimu’s campaign for improved quality of education in Tanzania.²⁴,²⁵

In these cases, CSOs were not able to gain traction in cooperating with the government, but were able to expand their engagement with other non-state actors. This helped them to achieve their objectives by mobilizing more participants in their campaigns and/or escalating their tactics from a constructive approach to a more confrontational one.

For example, TAC undertook two campaigns in South Africa: one aimed at providing access to comprehensive treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS, and another aimed at providing access to anti-retroviral treatment (ARVs) for all people living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa. In both of these cases, TAC’s modus operandi was to attempt a cooperative approach with the government and follow “formal established channels of communication with government before embarking on court action or civil disobedience.”²⁶

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²² Alison Hickey Tshangana, “The Impact of Litigation by the Legal Resources Centre for Adequate Classroom Infrastructure in South Africa” (International Budget Partnership, March 2013)
²⁴ Ruth Carlitz and Rosie McGee, “Raising The Stakes: The Impact of HakiElimu’s Advocacy Work on Education Policy and Budget in Tanzania” (International Budget Partnership, June 2013)
²⁶ Overy, “In the Face of Crisis: The Treatment Action Campaign Fights Government Inertia with Budget Advocacy and Litigation.” P.8
However, the South African government was unresponsive due to AIDS denialism. Thus, in both cases, TAC escalated their engagement tactics by building coalitions from the grassroots to the national level, engaging international NGOs, organizing civil disobedience campaigns, and garnering significant media attention around issues relevant to their campaign. For the mother-to-child transmission campaign, TAC ultimately sued the government of South Africa and won. In the anti-retroviral treatment campaign, they conducted extensive research and consultations, civil disobedience, and were preparing to bring litigation against the government when they received a leaked copy of a sensitive government report which they proceeded to publish. This leak pressured the government and the health department to respond and draw up a national ARV plan.

In another case, the LRC undertook litigation after efforts to cooperate with the government had failed. The “Seven Schools Case” aimed to improve school infrastructure to advance learning outcomes. The lawsuit was brought against the national and provincial governments, on behalf of the schools, for providing inadequate infrastructure. Since the case mainly focused on the Eastern Cape Province, the LRC engaged vertically from the community and school levels up to the provincial level. However, they also aimed to have an impact on national policy, so brought on a national-level joint applicant to join the local schools as litigants. To do this, they partnered with four main organizations, each of whom worked at a specific policy level or had a niche area of expertise. Each partner strategically engaged in their geographical or technical area. For example, Equal Education has wide community networks and memberships, and was therefore able to mobilize and sensitize communities, help to identify potential schools for participation, keep the campaign updated, manage expectations, and engage with the media. At the same time, Public Service Accountability Monitor has expertise in social accountability, budgets, and strategic plans, and was therefore able to support data analysis and review, while the Center for Child Law at the University of Pretoria served as co-applicant on the case. In this case, the LRC did not make extensive efforts to cooperate with the government. They decided on a more confrontational strategy based on the government’s previous failures to act on commitments to improve school infrastructure, as well as on repeated efforts by schools to communicate their needs to the province and to work with the education department to address these issues.

In the Pakistan case, following a devastating earthquake, the Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation engaged in the northwest region of the country to get the federal and local authorities to be better utilize funding for reconstruction. Specifically they urged the government to base spending decisions on peoples’ priorities and to actually verify that reconstruction was complete. The foundation created downward relationships in 57 communities. They worked with over 150 activists to identify the priorities of people living in affected communities, and checked those against the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority’s (ERRA) claims of what had been done versus what they had found.

This work engaged many local-level CSOs and grassroots constituencies. By working directly with communities, they were able to compile data that significantly differed from the official government information on
reconstruction. For example, they found that, by July 2008, only 175 out of 5,344 schools had been rebuilt and 30 out of 38 health centers had been restored. They targeted legislators with this evidence and mobilized popular protests in the nation’s capital, attracting significant media attention. Ultimately ERRA met with protestors and agreed that: 1) the ERRA must make the balance of all housing subsidy payments immediately; 2) the reconstruction of roads, health, education, and water supply facilities must be expedited; and 3) facilities must be provided to politically unstable areas. Reconstruction data show a rapid increase in transfers for housing compensation, health, water supply, and sanitation. This case demonstrates that CSOs can succeed in getting demands met while focusing only on downwards and horizontal cooperation across one or two policy levels, and where those cooperative relationships are largely concentrated within civil society.

FIGURE 5. POPULAR COOPERATION

Source: Developed by the author.

A case from South Africa demonstrates why attempts at constructive engagement, even if they initially fail, can be beneficial in the long term by fostering opportunities for the government to be constructive in the future. In this case, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) began as a popular campaign and eventually evolved into a campaign of
intensive cooperation. SJC worked with a broad range of stakeholders at the grassroots level in the Khayelitsha informal settlement to identify key priorities in the community and to develop a campaign. They decided to focus on the issue of access to toilets and sanitation facilities. The campaign aimed to ensure that toilets exist and that they are adequately maintained and monitored, and to pressure the city of Cape Town to provide clean and safe sanitation facilities. This required a policy change at the city level. The campaign engaged 1,500 members, 12 branches, and the executive council of the organization in Khayelitsha, and forged partnerships and cooperative activities with a number of other non-state organizations. Their engagement with the city initially focused on building a constructive relationship with the city and promoting a realistic response. When this failed, the organization began to mobilize its large grassroots constituency to protest and sign petitions. They did so in the most constructive manner possible, by providing advance warning to the city. During the first year the city was not receptive to their efforts and was unwilling to engage on issues of sanitation. During this phase, the campaign was a popular campaign. SJC organized a number of high profile protests which garnered media attention, developed a petition that was signed by over 10,000 individuals and 250 organizations, and distributed informational materials. They then organized a city wide meeting, the “Cape Town Sanitation Summit,” which was attended by 100 delegates from 60 partner organizations and by both major political parties. Their large membership gave them legitimacy in the eyes of the city and it became challenging to ignore them. Throughout this work, they collected significant information on the budget, status of sanitation and sanitation contracts, and used community members to monitor and check on service delivery.

However, the campaign evolved into an intensive campaign when a new mayor came to power in 2012 that was more receptive to engagement. The new mayor announced a new daily cleaning service for flush toilets in informal settlements which would employ 500 community members and would be financed with US$3.2 million in funding from the city. The city also began repairs, maintenance, and immediate sanitation improvements within Khayelitsha, announcing in late 2011 that it had repaired 256 toilets in Khayelitsha in the month of November. It also stated that it had replaced hundreds of toilet doors and missing manhole covers, raised others to prevent sewerage leaks, had improved repair turnaround times, geotagged toilets to enable repair teams to locate them, and installed toll free phones to report service delivery problems.27

SJC’s technical expertise and wide grassroots network allowed them to gather an analyze information that ultimately led to the campaign’s success. Their ongoing attempts at constructive engagement with the city ultimately paid off when a new mayor entered office and created an opportunity for them to cooperate. Furthermore, the grassroots support ensured that their efforts were seen as legitimate in the eyes of the

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government, and therefore required response. Thus, this case evolved from being popular cooperation to one of intensive cooperation when they were able to engage the mayor.

This campaign’s evolution was, however, not yet over. Despite a promising relationships with the city of Cape Town, the polarizing effects of the run up to the elections led to an about face by the city and they again became uncooperative. This forced the SJC to once again reevaluate and restructure their campaign.

These cases demonstrate a number of key lessons. First, where the government is uncooperative and unreceptive to the desired political changes, and elite champions cannot be identified, it becomes imperative for non-state actors to engage with each other through vertical and horizontal cooperative relationships (depending on the policy level where change is sought) to improve the likelihood of positive outcomes and apply more pressure on the government.

Second, almost all CSOs tried to use constructive engagement approaches in their interactions with government at various levels. They only escalated their strategies or tactics toward more confrontational approaches (such as protests, mass mobilization, litigation, text messaging campaigns, etc.) when all other approaches had failed. The fact they started by trying to engage, rather than starting with confrontational tactics, lent legitimacy to the campaign when they did eventually move to confrontational strategies. The SJC’s Axolile Notywala observed, “We don’t see ourselves as against government. If we want something achieved we will work with government and with communities and try and bring them together...we try as much as we can to work with them, rather than working against them.”\(^\text{28}\) This approach seems to have helped develop relationships of trust between the organizations and government counterparts who knew what to expect from the CSO as a partner and knew that the information they shared was also legitimate. It also allowed the SJC to switch from a popular campaign strategy, when the government was unreceptive to their ideas, to an intensive cooperation strategy, when a new mayor was elected. Unfortunately, this did not always result in cooperative relationships, but it may have legitimized the more confrontational tactics when they were used later. Indeed, where government is uncooperative, CSOs can gain more leverage by pursuing a more aggressive campaign. This can be done by changing tactics to be less cooperative, for example by pursuing litigation or civil disobedience, or through building relationships with more stakeholders and mobilizing more people, in order to garner more attention and increase the pressure on uncooperative government stakeholders.

Third, as demonstrated in the SJC case, attempts to engage constructively can create opportunities for future engagement when political tides change. Again, the lessons seems to be that it us an effective tactic to at least try to engage. For example, the new mayor coming to power created the opportunity for SJC to engage them based on

\(^{28}\) Overy “The Social Justice Coalition and Access to Basic Sanitation in Informal Settlements in Cape Town, South Africa.” p.9
the relationship they had built and their attempts at constructive engagement, and the change in leadership allowed them to become more cooperative.

Fourth, it is noteworthy that all these cases took place in countries that are less aid dependent and where donors may have had less influence. This may have allowed the governments in these countries to be less receptive to the democratic demands of CSOs. It also may have meant that CSOs could not benefit from similarly strong cooperation from international donors or NGOs, who may have less influence in these contexts. These contextual factors are important for CSOs when they design their campaigns and choose their potential partners.

Ultimately, many of these campaigns had successful outcomes, despite having limited cooperation with the government. These CSOs leveraged their relationships with other stakeholders to increase their power and the pressure they could apply to the state. In these cases, a wide network helped the campaign increase their influence, legitimacy, and/or create new opportunities for influence. And perhaps the network needed to be a little wider, given the unwillingness of government to engage.

4.4 LIMITED COOPERATION: LOW LEVELS OF COOPERATION WITH BOTH NON-STATE ACTORS AND GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS

The final category are those campaigns that operated relatively independently, with low levels of cooperation with both non-state actors and government stakeholders. This category includes five campaigns: the Civil Association for Equality and Justice’s (ACIJ) challenge to the city of Buenos Aires to provide early education, the BNDES Platform’s engagement on tax reform in Brazil, Public Service Accountability Monitor’s work on improving health budgets in South Africa, the Institute of Analysis and Advocacy’s engagement on fighting corruption in health facilities in Ukraine, and Sikika’s campaign to reduce “unnecessary expenditure” in Tanzania.  

29,30 Pakistan, South Africa and Brazil are all “low aid” or “very low aid” countries according to Jonathan Glennie and Annalisa Prizzon, “From High to Low Aid: A Proposal to Classify Countries by Aid Receipt” (Overseas Development Institute, March 2012).


33 Peter Spink, “The Art of Getting in the Way: Five Years of the BNDES Platform” (International Budget Partnership, June 2013)

34 Fernando Basch, “ACIJ Challenges the City of Buenos Aires to Provide Early Education - Public Litigation and Campaign Strategies 2006 to 2014” (International Budget Partnership, December 2015).
In many of these cases CSOs tried to forge highly cooperative relationship with either government stakeholders or with other non-state actors, or both. While they may have been temporarily successful, either government stakeholders failed to sustain their cooperation, or the CSO did not sustain activities with other non-state actors.

The ACIJ case from Argentina is a good example of how these relationships can evolve over time. ACIJ had been trying to get the city of Buenos Aires to fulfil their duty to provide early education to all children aged between 45 days and five years. Their campaign demonstrates the evolution of relationships and how strategies and tactics shift over time depending on their success. In the early years of their campaign, ACIJ sought to improve access to early education by working closely with community organizations; helping to organize them, running workshops and trainings, doing research, and drafting legislation. During this phase they found they could not get cooperation from the government and their efforts ultimately failed to achieve their aims. In 2008 they decided to pursue public interest litigation. They filed freedom of information requests for critical information to help inform their case and also a class action lawsuit. Throughout this process, some CSOs and certain members of the public were involved, for example in providing testimony or filing *amici curiae* (friends of the court) briefs. The government on the other hand wasn’t receptive to this lawsuit and did everything in their power to try and undermine these efforts. Indeed, despite the fact that ACIJ won the initial ruling and the first appeal, the city again filed a final appeal.

In 2008 a new minister of education was appointed who was more receptive to working with ACIJ to reach an agreement. This led to 8 months of cooperative work between the ACIJ and the city government to negotiate an agreed solution. At the end of this process, they conducted a public hearing and the court approved the agreement. However, ACIJ’s relationship with the government and civil society suffered after the agreement was put in place. The roundtables, designed to bring all stakeholders together to monitor implementation of the agreement, quickly descended in conflict — with the government and ACIJ representing opposing sides. ACIJ’s involvement with the parents of students standing to benefit also diminished during this period. Over the next three years, the city made halting progress on implementing the agreement. This led the ACIJ in 2014 to withdraw from the roundtable and stop cooperating with the city. They instead asked the monitoring judge to remind legislators to comply with the agreement and resumed community engagement through a campaign called *Ni un chico sin escuela* (No child out of school). In late 2014 they presented a petition with 20,000 signatures to parliament. This new strategy of mobilizing the public to help enforce the legal decision was a success and, at the time of the case study, ACIJ was looking at more ways to combine citizen engagement with legal pressure to force an uncooperative government to abide by their commitments.

Like the SJC case mentioned above, this case also demonstrates how campaigns and relationships evolve over time. Early campaign attempts at citizen mobilization failed to achieve their results because they had an unresponsive and uncooperative government, and were unable to garner enough power to shift the government’s
position. ACIJ responded by switching tactics, focusing less on broad public participation and more on public litigation. As attention shifted to the legal work, their focus on community outreach decreased. Simultaneously their relationship with the government, whose stance was one of intransigence throughout the legal proceedings, reached a low point. The appointment of a new minister of education, however, provided a fresh opportunity for cooperation and in 2008 ACIJ worked closely with the government to reach a negotiated agreement. However, the implementation took too long and the mechanisms to monitor implementation quickly faltered, shifting the relationship between ACIJ and the government from cooperative to antagonistic. While the relationship with the government reached a new low, so too did ACIJ’s outreach to civil society and citizens, which stalled progress on the campaign. It was only after the roundtables failed (through which they tried to force the government to act) that ACIJ left this arrangement and again began to mobilize citizens and the public for this campaign. The heightened community engagement, petitions, and media pressure forced renewed action by the government.

FIGURE 6. LIMITED COOPERATION

This case offers a prime example of what happens when government is not cooperative or responsive, and why it is important to engage a broad range of stakeholders. In the first instance, where government was not responsive,
ACIJ changed tactics from cooperative approaches to the much more antagonistic pursuit of public litigation. Other antagonistic strategies they may have considered (but didn’t) could have been even more aggressive mobilization of the public through protests, petitions, or civil disobedience. (Cases in South Africa demonstrate how such a strategy can work.) This switch eventually forced the government to cooperate and negotiate an agreed settlement. Once the agreement was reached, however, ACIJ lacked sufficient power to ensure it was implemented and to sustain cooperation.

A case in Brazil offers a good example of why popular or intensive cooperation does not always work. IBASE, a local CSO, attempted to build an overarching coalition called the BNDES Platform that brought together more than 25 coalitions interested in the transparency of Brazil’s development bank, but lacked sufficient resources to do so. This resulted in challenges to the Platform, since the coalition was really only a loosely coupled cluster of networks made up of heterogeneous organizations with differences stances on which tactics and strategies were appropriate. These challenging internal dynamics and differences, as well as funding constraints, ultimately led to a less impactful campaign.

During the period documented in the case study, these campaigns achieved mixed outcomes. ACIJ used confrontational campaign tactics by pursuing an uncooperative government through litigation. While they were successful in the courts, weaker engagement with civil society and beneficiaries made it challenging to ensure the rulings were implemented. Towards the end of what the period that the case study documented, they had begun making fresh progress in this area by engaging other stakeholders and it seemed a promising avenue of future work. In the BNDES Platform case, though some temporary transparency gains were achieved, the result was not directly attributable to the BNDES intervention. Overall, these cases demonstrate that, where CSOs lack strong relationships, either with powerful elite actors or with wider civil society, they may face challenges in achieving the desired campaign outcomes.

5. KEY FINDINGS

The cases show that to achieve successful budget outcomes CSOs cannot operate in a vacuum, they must build relationships. To be successful these relationships must exhibit relatively high levels of cooperation in terms of their strength and intensity. However, the cases also demonstrate that the forms these cooperative relationships can take are varied. This variation depends on a number of factors, including the external environment and the choice of strategy and tactics.
Three main categories of relationships which can lead to successful outcomes emerged from the review.

1. **Intensive cooperation campaigns**: highly cooperative campaigns that engage a wide number of state and non-state actors across multiple policy levels.
2. **Elite cooperation campaigns**: cooperation with elite stakeholders, such as state actors or donors, who have sufficient power to influence the desired policies.
3. **Popular cooperation campaigns**: cooperation between CSOs and other non-state organizations at one level or across multiple levels, for example through grassroots mobilization.

### 5.1 INTENSIVE COOPERATION CAMPAIGNS

Intensive cooperation campaigns were successful, particularly where they were monitoring government policies or programs across multiple policy levels. However, working with many stakeholders on many levels requires funding and a large amount of technical, logistical, managerial, and human resources. Many organizations lack these resources. The Fundar case in Mexico is a good example of an organization that tried to cooperate vertically but lacked the skills, experience, and resources to do so. Further, cooperating with organizations that have differing ideas on the goals or methods to be used can create friction which, as was seen in the BNDES Platform case, can undermine a campaign. CSOs need to reflect on their capacity, the resources at their disposal, and the aims of their campaign when considering which stakeholders to engage with at which level. They also need to consider whether they have the resources and capacity to build and manage these relationships.

### 5.2 ELITE COOPERATION CAMPAIGNS

It is not necessary to work at every policy level. The cases of elite cooperation demonstrate that, where it is feasible, cooperative relationships with government stakeholders or other elite actors, such as donors (particularly in aid dependent countries), can be highly effective. In some cases this change can be rapid. For example, cases in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Honduras, where IBP and national stakeholders worked directly with finance ministries, demonstrate that changes can be achieved quickly where government is receptive to this change, despite their more limited engagement or cooperation with other non-state actors.

Elite cooperation may be formal or informal. Cases of formal cooperation, for example in Ghana and Palestine where there was a formal partnership or an MoU, can facilitate access to information and legitimize the work of CSOs. However, formal relationships only work insofar as there is some degree of good will and cooperative spirit. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the ACIJ case demonstrates that a formal mechanism (the roundtable) created to monitor implementation of the agreement floundered because these formal relationships become
contentious. ACIJ’s made more progress when they left the formal working group and began using other tactics and strategies to mobilize non-state actors to enforce the agreement. Other examples demonstrate where informal collaborations were highly effective, including contributions that were made informally to the Uganda HRH campaign and the Dalit Campaign in India, as well as information leaked to the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa.

The cases also demonstrated that cooperation can be fickle and dependent on a continuously evolving political situation. This fluidity means that CSOs should foster relationships with multiple actors or agencies to identify opportunities, develop allies, and monitor the political environment. Monitoring changes in the political situation is important for identifying new opportunities for cooperation that may arise where they did not previously exist. Examples of such opportunities include the appointment of a new minister of education in the ACIJ case and a new mayor in the SJC case.

5.3 POPULAR COOPERATION CAMPAIGNS

The popular cooperation campaigns demonstrate that, where government is not cooperative or is hostile, broadening and deepening relationships with other non-state actors (both vertically and horizontally) becomes imperative. Where government cooperation was low, only those campaigns that had high cooperation with other non-state actors were relatively successful. Where there is little or no cooperation with government, CSOs must join forces and leverage their mutual strengths to increase their relative power and influence. Cases in South Africa and Pakistan demonstrated the power of bringing people together to advocate for their rights through vertical accountability.

5.4 YOU CANNOT GO IT ALONE

This review demonstrates that CSOs cannot go it alone. They need either cooperation from elite stakeholders, from a wider network of non-state actors, or both. They must also engage across multiple policy levels to gain enough leverage and power to influence a government unwilling to cooperate. Campaigns that failed to build strong cooperative relationships demonstrated much weaker outcomes.
## ANNEX 1: LIST OF CASE STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Report Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Budget Transparency in Afghanistan: A Pathway to Building Public Trust in the State</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Nematullah Bizhan</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ACIJ challenges the City of Buenos Aires to provide early education – public litigation and campaign strategies 2006 to 2014</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Fernando Basch</td>
<td>2011 / Updated 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Role of Brazilian Civil Society in the Tax Reform Debate: INESC’s Tax Campaign for Social Justice,</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Evilasio Salvador</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Art of Getting in the Way: Five Years of the BNDES Platform</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Peter Spink</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Impact of the Open Budget Initiative Secretariat and its Partners on Budget Transparency in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Claire Schouten and Jean-Pierre Samolia Monamoto</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Impact of the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Survey and its Partner Institutions’ Advocacy on Budget Transparency in Honduras</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Hugo Noe Pino</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tracking Funds for India’s Most Deprived: The Story of the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights’ “Campaign 789”</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Vimala Ramachandran and Sapna Goel</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Samarthan’s Campaign to Improve Implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India [published December 2011, updated November 2013]</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Ramesh Awasthi</td>
<td>2011/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Evidence for Change: The Case of Subsidios al Campo in Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Guillermo M. Cejudo</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Health, Citizenship, and Human Rights Advocacy Initiative: Improving Access to Health Services in Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Almudena Ocejo</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Earthquake Reconstruction in Pakistan: The Case of the Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation’s Campaign</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pervez Tahir</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Student audits of local public services in Palestine</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Belal Fallah</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>In the Face of Crisis: The Treatment Action Campaign Fights Government Inertia with Budget Advocacy and Litigation</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Neil Overy</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>South African Legal Resources Centre Successfully Advocates for Adequate Education Facilities</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Alison Hickey Tshangana</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>When Opportunity Beckons: The Impact of the Public Service Accountability Monitor’s Work on Improving Health Budgets in South Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Alta Folscher and John Kruger</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Freeing Funds to Meet Priorities and Needs: Sikika’s Campaign to Curb Unnecessary Expenditure in Tanzania</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Peter Bofin</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Raising The Stakes: The Impact of HakiElimu’s Advocacy Work on Education Policy and Budget in Tanzania</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Rose Carlitz and Rosie McGee</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Wajibika Mama Aishi – White Ribbon Alliance – Tanzania’s (WRAT) campaign to improve maternal health in Tanzania</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Peter Bofin</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>White Ribbon Alliance Uganda’s &quot;Act now to save mothers&quot;</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Jillian Larsen</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Human Resources for Health Campaign</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Jillian Larsen</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Combating Corruption in Health Facilities in Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Iryna Postolovska</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 2: CAMPAIGN CLASSIFICATION TABLE

### Level of Cooperation with Non-State and State Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Non State Actors</th>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Outcome Successful?</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>INESC</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In cases with high levels of cooperation with non-state actors and government stakeholders, all cases had positive outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>SEND-Ghana</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Samarthan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed (1)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Social Justice Coalition</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>White Ribbon Alliance</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>White Ribbon Alliance</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Health Human Resources for</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>IBP</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In cases with high level of cooperation with government stakeholders, CSOs already have avenues for influence, and thus don’t require cooperation with other non state actors to be successful. However, it’s worth noting that in some cases cooperation with government stakeholders was not receptive to cooperation. Thus, CSOs required higher levels of cooperation with other non state actors to achieve their objectives. In these cases it is the wide network of other stakeholders that increase their influence, legitimacy, provide mixed (1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>IBP and REGED</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>IBP and CIPRODEH</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>FUNDAR</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Integrity Action</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Treatment Action Campaign</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In all of these cases, CSOs had no or limited cooperation with government stakeholders because these actors were not receptive to cooperation. Thus, CSOs required higher levels of cooperation with other non state actors to achieve their objectives. In these cases it is the wide network of other stakeholders that increase their influence, legitimacy, provide mixed (2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Legal Resource Center</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Omar Saghar Khan Development Foundation</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>HakiElimu</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>ACU</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed (2)</td>
<td>These cases had relatively low levels of cooperation with non-state and state actors. For the most part, these cases also had less successful outcomes in influencing the government agenda. These cases demonstrate that you can’t have success without higher cooperation with partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>BNDES Platform</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Public Service Accountability Monitor</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Institute of Analysis and Advocacy</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed (6)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Sikika</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Samarthan case demonstrates importance of scaling / vertically and horizontally when monitoring service delivery. Expanding to 10 districts and including more stakeholders in the second round of their campaign increased success. However, it seems they may still have needed more partners to influence the national level policy and/or to provide enforcement and oversight of lower local government officials.

(2) Mixed results largely because the timeline for the intervention was too short. This does not reflect whether the relationships they created were sufficient.

(3) ACU won the legal battle, but had a hard time ensuring implementation. When they initiated more community engagement, they also had more success.

(4) IBASE tried to cooperate with other CSOs through a loose network, but competing priorities and different ideas on which tactics or strategies should be used created challenges in the cooperation with organizations. This was combined with lack of funding for cooperative activities, which ultimately resulted in relatively weak cooperation.

(5) PSAM in South Africa had loose cooperation with other CSOs at the national level, for example by sharing research findings and providing technical inputs for other CSOs’ work or campaigns (for example evidence for trials.) However, engagement seems to be loose / ad hoc, not continuous engagement on this specific set of campaign activities.

(6) IAA tried many times to engage government but had failed until they were able to identify a reformer interested in rooting out embedded corruption. Worked with a small number of NGOs on their campaign. Had some preliminary success in getting this individual to issue a new order on voluntary contributions and charities, but has had extremely limited impact on practice since there is no enforcement mechanism.

Basch, Fernando. “ACIJ Challenges the City of Buenos Aires to Provide Early Education - Public Litigation and Campaign Strategies 2006 to 2014.” Unpublished


Glennie, Jonathan, and Annalisa Prizzon. “From High to Low Aid: A Proposal to Classify Countries by Aid Receipt.” Overseas Development Institute, March 2012.


